Literature & Theology, Vol. 27. No. 4, December 2013, pp. 472–486
doi:10.1093/litthe/frt035
THEY HAVE EYES THAT THEY
MIGHT NOT SEE: WALTER
BENJAMIN’S AURA AND THE
OPTICAL UNCONSCIOUS
Arianne Conty!
This essay will reflect upon the significance of Walter Benjamin’s conception
of the aura.1 Much has been written about the aura, particularly in relation
to Benjamin’s essay ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical
Reproduction’. In this work and elsewhere, Benjamin speaks of the aura
as ‘the unique appearance of a distance, however near it may be’, and associates this auratic distance with the inapproachability of the cult image. But
in other texts, Benjamin speaks of the aura in different terms, as the ability of
phenomena to ‘look back’ (den Blick aufzuschlagen), to return our gaze. This
definition moves beyond a merely aesthetic model to a conception of the
aura as a mode of perception that rather than seeking to rationally control
and reduce phenomena to objects of perception, allows them to appear of
their own accord. At stake in this second definition is intersubjective relationality, the possibility of encountering alterity. This essay will attempt to
explain the divergence between these two conceptions of aura by re-evaluating the role of the optical unconscious in Benjamin’s work. In the same
way that Benjamin used Proust’s mémoire involontaire as a tool to formulate his
understanding of the redemption of history, he can be understood as using
the optical unconscious to allow the world to appear outside the hegemonic
control of the alienating cult image. In this sense, rather than simply celebrating the decline of aura as his Artwork essay proclaims, Benjamin can be
understood as seeking to replace the traditional aura of full presence by an
unconscious aura that allows the past to meet our gaze without being appropriated by institutional power.
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Department of International Studies, American University
of Sharjah, 26666 Sharjah, UAE. Email: aconty@aus.edu
!
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Abstract
THE OPTICAL UNCONSCIOUS
473
In the scopic field, everything is articulated between two terms that act in an
antinomic way—on the side of things, there is the gaze, that is to say, things look
at me, and yet I see them. This is how one should understand those words, so
strongly stressed, in the Gospel, they have eyes that they might not see. That they
might not see what? Precisely that things are looking at them.2
Jacques Lacan
I. THE WITHERING OF THE AURA
That which withers in the age of mechanical reproduction is the aura of the work
of art. . . . One might generalize by saying: the technique of reproduction
detaches the reproduced object from the domain of tradition. By making many
reproductions it substitutes a plurality of copies for a unique existence.4
The aura here, is the uniqueness of an object, which contributes to its traditional role, to its sacred or what Benjamin calls its cult status.
Thanks to mechanical reproduction, the image is separated from its spatiotemporal context and its traditional cult status, and its copies can be distributed
and controlled by the masses who displace it at will, thereby changing its
meaning and democratising its function. The unique presence of the original
is dissipated into the appearance of the decontextualised copy. Unlike the
reactionary critic of his and our own day, Benjamin sees this transformation
from original to copy, from presence to absence, as positive and liberating and
celebrates photography and especially film, as the technological media that
enact the ‘withering’ of the aura, by destroying the exclusivity of access that
renders the image ‘distant’ from its viewers. He famously writes:
Then came the film and burst this prison word asunder by the dynamite of the
tenth of a second, so that now, in the midst of its far-flung ruins and debris, we
calmly and adventurously go travelling.5
In their desire to get close to things, to generalise the unicity of objects of art
by reproducing them, Benjamin implies that it is the universalising intention
of the masses that is realised in technological reproduction, and thus that a
form of technological revolution is imminent. The cut of the camera, which
destroys the continuity of experience, like the fragments of the past he cites to
destroy the continuity of history, capture the lost details, the tell-tale clues that
betray an experience that cannot be lived, an absent or unconscious collage of
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Let us begin with the definitions of aura that Benjamin gives in his essay ‘The
Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’, where he defines it as
the ‘shattering of tradition’ brought about when mechanical reproduction
separates the work of art from ‘its presence in time and space, its unique
existence at the place where it happens to be’.3 He writes:
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We define the aura of the latter as the unique phenomenon of a distance, however
close it may be. If, while resting on a summer afternoon, you follow with your eyes
a mountain range on the horizon or a branch which casts its shadow over you, you
experience the aura of those mountains, of that branch. This image makes it easy to
comprehend the social bases of the contemporary decay of the aura. It rests on two
circumstances, both of which are related to the increasing significance of the masses
in contemporary life. Namely, the desire of contemporary masses to bring things
‘closer’ spatially and humanly, which is just as ardent as their bent toward
overcoming the uniqueness of every reality by accepting its reproduction.10
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images that no longer depend upon linear time and space, and thus liberated,
can give to be seen a non-continuous experience that resembles Benjamin’s
understanding of redemption: the fragments of the past that can surge into the
present as the now. This ‘time of the now’ he writes, ‘is shot through with
chips of messianic time’.6
In the age of technological reproducibility, the aura’s decline is described as
inevitable due to the masses continually getting closer to things spatially and
replacing uniqueness with sameness by means of technological reproduction.
Considering the survival of the cult image in the cinematic forms of the
Hollywood star cult or the fascist mass spectacle, its decline, if decline there
be, cannot but be understood in positive terms. Yet Benjamin’s celebration of
the marriage of art and technology seems to adhere to a somewhat naı̈ve view
in technological progress. This was the point of view of Adorno who criticised
the Artwork essay for ‘exaggerating the progressive aspects of mass culture
while denying its reactionary ones’.7 Though the camera can play the role of
the optical unconscious that the mémoire involontaire was able to play to retrieve
forgotten history, the out of sequence cuts that are collated together often
create a false continuity for the spectator, who enters into a context that is
anything but post-ideological, anything but free from the hegemony of institutional manipulation and power relations.
This is equally the case with photography.8 Though the camera can of
course capture and freeze what was hidden, with important political and
social impact, the revolutionary potential of technological media is in no
way guaranteed by the camera itself, which can and is often manipulated
precisely by those traditional institutions Benjamin thought it could disengage
itself from (one might think of publicity or imbedded journalism in Iraq for
examples of this).9 There are many ways, then, in which modern photography
continues to incarnate the originary auratic function of the cult image, rather
than contradicting it as Benjamin’s Weltbild essay intends.
But more problematic is Benjamin’s attribution, in the same Artwork essay,
of aura to the world of nature as well, drawing a parallel between nature and
artifact. He writes:
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475
This necessary distance that sets the object of vision apart is explicitly linked to
the object’s cult value, endowing it with a quality of inapproachability.
Benjamin clarifies this point in a footnote:
The definition of the aura as the ‘unique apparition of a distance, however near it
may be’, represents nothing more than a formulation of the cult value of the
work of art in categories of spatiotemporal perception. Distance is the opposite of
nearness. The essentially distant object is the unapproachable one.
Inapproachability is, indeed, a primary quality of the cult image.11
What is the aura, actually? A strange weave of space and time (ein sonderbares
Gespinst aus Raum und Zeit): the unique appearance of distance, no matter how
close the object may be. While resting on a summer’s noon, to trace a range of
mountains on the horizon, or a branch which casts its shadow on the observer,
until the moment or the hour become part of their appearance—this is what it
means to breathe the aura of those mountains, that branch.12
The distance preserved in the face of proximity here comes to indicate the
aesthetic experience, a ‘profane illumination’ or transcendent immanence that
occurs when time becomes space. Like Proust’s madeleine, which held his
childhood intact in its flavour, Benjamin similarly seems to understand the
auratic object as having the ability to capture time in the materiality of an aesthetic experience. If this experience can be controlled and manipulated with
regard to the cult status of the work of art, what are we to make of this strange
weave inhering in our experience of nature? In other words, Benjamin’s artwork essay outlines a theory of intentionality regarding the image that seems
to be at odds with his examples from nature.
II. THE GAZE OF THE AURA
An interpretation of this mimetic parallel between nature and artefact can be
found in Benjamin’s essay, ‘On some Motifs in Baudelaire’, where the reciprocal human gaze is attributed to the non-human phenomenal world, be it an
artifact or a mountain range. He writes:
Experience of the aura thus rests on the transposition of a response common in
human relationships to the relationship between the inanimate or natural object
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If Benjamin critiques the distance of the cult image because it reinforces the
version of history imposed by the victors as sacrosanct, it is difficult to understand in what way the mountain range or the branch illustrate his point in this
essay. He adds an element of clarification in his ‘Little History of Photography’
essay, where he repeats this image almost literally. He writes:
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476
and man. The person we look at, or who feels he is being looked at, looks at us in
turn. To perceive the aura of an object we look at means to invest it with the
ability to look at us in return.13
And again:
Inherent in the gaze . . . is the expectation that it will be returned by that on
which it is bestowed. Where this expectation is met . . . there is an experience of
the aura in all its fullness.14
means to invest it with the ability to look back at us. This ability corresponds to
the data of mémoire involontaire. (These data, incidentally, are unique: they are lost
to the memory that seeks to retain them. Thus, they lend support to a concept of
the aura that involves the ‘unique apparition of a distance’.18
In this quote, Benjamin actually refers simultaneously to both investing the
object with a gaze of reciprocity while at the same time describing the aura as
involuntary and lost to conscious memory. He explicitly describes the mémoire
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Nature, like the cult object, has an aura to the extent that it has been invested
or endowed with the capacity to return our gaze. On this reading, it is this
investment of the imagination that empowers the cult object and can explain
the sacralisation and anthropomorphisation or personification of nature in
many ancient cultures. Aura would thus illustrate a theory of projection,
the projection of consciousness, of familiarity, and hence of intentionality,
to the non-human world of nature. Aura would come to signify the projection of the known onto the unknown, and find a place alongside projection
theories of religion.15
This interpretation would imply that the technological mastery of
nature would effectively ‘disenchant’ it, to use the term of sociologist
Max Weber, transforming an intersubjective relationality into one of utilitarian mastery. In the same way, reproducing works of art such that they
can be found on each street corner would create the crowd effect
described by Baudelaire, where we find ourselves surrounded by eyes
of unseeing, ‘mirror-like blankness’, the eyes of the city dweller which
have ‘lost their ability to look’16 due to the excess of stimulation of life
in the city.17
Yet, if Benjamin implies, in his text on Baudelaire, that the reciprocal gaze
is enabled by means of an investment on the part of the subject, in this very
same text he also draws a connection with Proust’s mémoire involontaire, stating
that the aura cannot be controlled and willingly retained. To experience the
aura of something:
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477
involontaire as standing outside of conscious experience altogether. He writes,
in the same article on Baudelaire:
Only what has not been experienced explicitly and consciously, what has not
happened to the subject as an experience, can become a component of the
mémoire involontaire.19
This necessity of surrendering the will is something Benjamin will reiterate in
other texts, notably the Arcades Project, where aura is described as requiring a
passivity on the part of the subject. Thus we read:
And again, when he differentiates the aura from the trace:
The trace is appearance of a nearness, however far removed the thing that left it
behind may be. The aura is appearance of a distance, however close the thing that
calls it forth. In the trace, we gain possession of the thing, in the aura it takes
possession of us.21
Miriam Bratu Hansen has emphasised this passive reception of the aura in her
interpretation of Benjamin. She writes for instance:
The auratic quality that manifests itself in the object—‘the unique appearance of
a distance, however near it may be’—cannot be produced at will; it appears to the
subject, not for it.22
This passive reception that allows the world or the other to appear of its own
accord, is often evoked to describe poetic, artistic and phenomenological
inspiration and continues to be invoked through and in the technological
media of photography and film. Whether conceptualised in terms of loss or
an uncanny déjà vu, this gaze confronts the subject with a fundamental strangeness that recalls a deeper recollection of the self. The dynamic of this gaze can
be encountered in Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the chiasme, which
describes the crossing and interpenetration of what gazes and what is gazed at.
Or one thinks of Cézanne, weeping when he felt himself to be observed by
the Sainte-Victoire mountain range. One might also think of the experience
of psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, when he describes his overwhelming experience as a child of meeting the gaze of a tin can floating in the sea. As Hansen
has pointed out, Benjamin identifies this auratic gaze with poetry, Goethe’s
‘Mothers’, Bachofen’s Vorwelt, Baudelaire’s ‘vie antérieure’, Novalis’
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The fleeting moment of auratic perception actualizes a past not ordinarily
accessible to the waking self; it entails a passivity in which something ‘takes
possession of us’ rather than vice versa.20
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23
perceptibility, all of which describe a gaze that haunts the subject from a fardistant past. The gaze of this past unexpectedly interrupts the habits of linear
time used to fulfil the teleological goals of the status quo, replacing them with
the shocks of a familiar unknown, when the ‘photographic plate of remembrance’ freezes time in an image that captures what was repressed or censored.
This is what Benjamin means when he uses Proust’s idea of the mémoire
involontaire to speak of the camera’s ability to retrieve what has been lost to
our conscious mind. In The Arcades Project, he cites the following words from
Du coté de chez Swann:
Hidden in the contingent fragment and brought to light by the flash of a
photographic cut, Benjamin reveals that the past does not live within us, but
rather, like Proust’s famous madeleine, in the world of things. In Benjamin’s
historical materialism, memory thus becomes an imminently political entity,
because the control of artefacts and their mediation is the key not only to our
past, but also to the future of that past which brings us, for a brief instant, the
image of our present.
Hidden in Benjamin’s conception of the aura we therefore find a somewhat
confused, or at least confusing, theory of intentionality. Does seeing the
image, object or landscape require our passive reception, or rather is it the
subject who actively decides to endow the image with reciprocity? In other
words, does the aura inhere in the object or is it a projection (like fetishism) on
the part of the observer? Do we grant phenomena the capacity to look back at
us, or is it rather the passivity of the gaze that allows for alterity to present
itself? What is at stake in this difference is the capacity for the world to appear
to us without being a mirror of our (or someone else’s) will to power, what
Heidegger calls the enframing (gestell) of our techno-scientific world-view.25
III. THE OPTICAL UNCONSCIOUS
Benjamin thus critiques a certain conception of the aura linked to the unicity
of cult art, which is consciously invested with the capacity to return our gaze,
and thus to interpellate us according to the script given to art by institutions of
power that, at least in the context of Western art, controlled both the access to
and the interpretation of, the cult object. But at the same time, he retains and
develops another conception of the aura—understood through the key of the
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And so it is with our own past. It is a labour in vain to attempt to recapture it: all
the efforts of our intellect must prove futile. The past is hidden somewhere
outside the realm, beyond the reach, of intellect, in some material object . . . which we do not suspect. And as for that object, it depends on chance
whether we come upon it or not before we ourselves must die.24
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479
. . . the most precise technology can give its products a magical value, such as a
painted picture can never again have for us. No matter how artful the
photographer, no matter how carefully posed his subject, the beholder feels an
irresistible urge to search such a picture for the tiny spark of contingency, of the
here and now, with which reality has (so to speak) seared the subject, to find the
inconspicuous spot where in the immediacy of that long-forgotten moment the
future subsists so eloquently that we, looking back, may rediscover it. For it is
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optical unconscious that is enabled by the very forms of technology that cause
the decline of the cult status of the image. Technological media allows for an
image of the past, lost to our conscious mind and lost to the history constructed by the victors, to surge into view. It is the unconscious eye of the
camera that elicits a response and reveals the configuration of the present
hidden in a snapshot of the past.
If the distance of the aura can be understood as temporal rather than
spatial, when, as Benjamin writes in his ‘Little History of Photography’
essay, time fuses with appearance, then it becomes clear that the aura so
described does not disappear with the arrival of mechanical reproduction.
Not only does it not disappear, but it also comes to overlap in important
ways with Benjamin’s conception of the redemption of history. For
Benjamin, photography, and especially film, are means of accessing a past
lost from view, erased from normative history and the conscious mind, a
past captured in an image that brings the present into focus. He is attempting, in his own words, ‘to carry over the principle of montage into history’.26 Just as he attempts to disrupt the unified and continuous historical
paradigm of the victors by citing the unclaimed fragments of the past that
escape control, so he here attempts to find in technology a means of
shattering the homogeneous and controllable image by means of the fragmentary medium of the camera, which manages to capture the unintended
real and thereby reveal the relevance of a hidden past to the configuration of
the present. Like the unique work of art, the unique historic event is
wrenched from its context in order to be reproduced, re-enacted in and
as present. This desacralisation undermines the temporal continuity that
mummifies and makes the past somehow inviolable, like the cult image.
By pointing to the impossibility of the conscious mind to appropriate the
optical unconscious, Benjamin describes the image as surfacing like a dream,
giving us the code to decipher the present. In his article ‘A Little History of
Photography’, he writes of the uncanny way in which the cut of the camera
captures the ‘spark of contingency’, the long-forgotten real, which reveals to
us the future of the past. In this sense, his appropriation of Proust’s mémoire
involontaire to formulate the optical unconscious of the camera takes on a
fuller meaning. I quote at length:
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another nature that speaks to the camera than to the eye: ‘other’ in the sense that
a space interwoven with human consciousness gives way to a space interwoven
with the unconscious. It is through photography that we first discover the
existence of this optical unconscious, just as we discover the instinctual
unconscious through psychoanalysis.27
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Captured by the unconscious eye of the camera, the photograph (and the
cinematic image even more so), reveal to us the ‘inconspicuous spot’ where
the future of the past comes into focus, a spot that cannot be consciously
conjured but that must appear involuntarily. As the site of the optical unconscious, the technologically mediated image can be seen only when this
dialectic of making near and making distant is frozen by the flash of the
camera, which rips the ‘tiny spark of contingency’ out of the long-forgotten
past. Benjamin calls this standstill a ‘dialectical image’,28 an image that seems to
encompass the ‘magical value’ of the aura once it has been freed from the
restrictions of the cult image. This reality, he writes, ‘sears’ the subject with
the ‘here and now’, for him the true site of history. Like a dream or a déja
vu, the past emerges ‘as an image flashing up in the now of its recognizability’,29 the Jetztzeit or nunc stans that condenses time as duration into a
single instant. As he puts it in ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’, ‘history
is the subject of a structure whose site is not homogeneous, empty time, but
time filled by the presence of the now (Jetztzeit)’.30 This ‘now’ is filled with an
infinite distance, that of possibility, in particular the possibility of justice that
Benjamin calls the messianic. ‘The authentic concept of universal history’, he
writes in The Arcades Project, ‘is a messianic concept’,31 when the historian
‘establishes a conception of the present as the ‘‘time of the now’’ which is shot
thought with chips of messianic time’.32 Because the past is not an idea, but
lives on in the material world, it is by juxtaposing ruins that he hopes to build
the groundwork for a photomontage, in which each memory, like a wandering Jew, reminds the survivor that the Promised Land is not a place but the
repetitive act of restitution (tikkun), of picking up the broken pieces.
If for philosopher Jacques Derrida the openness of the future entails that the
messianic never come, that it remain pure futurity, it appears that for
Benjamin this pure futurity only becomes future after the fact, that is, when
it can redeem the past. The Messiah can come, that is, only belatedly, or as
Kafka put it, ‘the Messiah will only come when he is no longer necessary.
He’ll come only a day after his coming . . .’ Benjamin owned the drawing by
Paul Klee that aptly figures this messianic impossibility: it is that of the Angelus
Novus, who is swept forward by a great wind, yet with its back turned on the
future, staring fixedly into the past.
The trauma of the present thus lies in its closure for Benjamin, for this closure
eradicates the possibility of glimpsing a different future. It was Benjamin’s
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481
IV. THE AURA THRIVES IN ITS DECLINE
35
By reproducing or copying phenomena through the lens of the camera, the
dialectical image creates a weave of space and time, of presence and absence,
which undermines attempts to ‘enshrine’ phenomena in terms of an ideology
of wholeness and continuity. For Benjamin, it is this split between near and
distant, then and now, present and absent, that is the saving element of history,
for as he writes, phenomena ‘are saved through the exhibition of the fissure
within them’.36 Just as psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan writes of the unconscious/
conscious divide that ‘the subject is this very split’, Benjamin similarly understands this fissure as showing the subject her own lost halo.
If the dialectical image is this fissure or split, or what Benjamin calls ‘caesura’, then it shows the subject, in the end, an image of herself. The return of
the gaze described as constituting aura thus becomes our own, returning to us
from the past. The aura would thus elicit the experience of self as other,
presenting us with the gaze of our own forgotten selves. ‘It is ourselves,
however, who are always standing at the center of these rare images’,
Benjamin writes in ‘A Berlin Chronicle’, where he describes an auratic encounter of ‘sudden illumination’ when what he calls a ‘deeper self’ flashes into
memory like a snapshot. ‘It is to this immolation of our deepest self in shock’
he writes, ‘that our memory owes its most indelible images’.37 Similarly, in ‘A
Short Speech on Proust’, he reiterates this uncanny encounter of meeting the
gaze of the self as other in the darkroom of the present. I quote at length:
Concerning the mémoire involontaire: not only do its images appear without being
called up; rather, they are images we have never seen before we remember them.
This is most clearly the case in those images in which—as in some dreams—we
see ourselves. We stand in front of ourselves, the way we might have stood
somewhere in a prehistoric past, but never before our waking gaze. Yet these
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present that was unlivable under National Socialism, and he turned to the past
in order to leave open the possibility for redemption. Because there is no
continuity but that of oppression, the future cannot be planned for
Benjamin. Only by turning to the past and disordering it, raising the oppressed
back to the surface, allowing memory to reclaim what it was not allowed to
experience, can the future remain open. Paradoxically then, Benjamin redeems
the future by returning to the past, as if the already and the not yet could alone
heal the trauma of the present. Remembrance then, is itself redemptive, and the
dialectical image is itself the image of the Messiah in that it opens up the present
as Jetztzeit, or what he calls ‘a Messianic cessation of happening’,33 which allows
us to experience the now and glimpse in its incompletion (and in our own
incompletion)34 the lineaments of an open future.
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images, developed in the darkroom of the lived moment, are the most important
we shall ever see. One might say that our most profound moments have been
equipped—like those cigarette packs—with a little image, a photograph of
ourselves. And that ‘whole life’ which, as they say, passes through the minds of
people who are dying or confronting life-threatening danger is composed of such
little images. They flash by in as rapid a sequence as the booklets of our
childhood, precursors of the cinematograph, in which we admired a boxer, a
swimmer, or a tennis player.38
REFERENCES
1
Much has been written about Benjamin’s
supposed confusion, or even for Klaus
Weimar, ‘slip of the tongue’, in using
the word aura instead of auréole, a word
perhaps better suited to the phenomena
he describes. If aura was a medical term
connoting the ‘breath of wind’ that could
traverse the body prior to an epileptic
attack (Klaus Weimar, in Mapping
Benjamin: The Work of Art in the Digital
Age, p. 188), auréole refers to the ‘ornamental halo’ (Umzirkung) that ‘encloses’
an object or being, ‘as in a case’
(Futteral), according to Benjamin’s own
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Using the blind eye of the camera to reveal our inapproachable distance from
ourselves helps to undermine the alienating myth that reifies the subject as
ontologically whole and self-certain, made in the image of a continuous and
univocal world. The ego, like the cult image, rules over a dogmatic monarchy
where other voices are silenced in the name of unity and self-presence.
Instead, Benjamin’s auratic image calls up an image of the self outside the
self,39 Rimbaud’s Je est un autre. The active remembering of citations left out of
the canon and the passive remembrance of the images left out of history thus
function for Benjamin as a means of salvation, to save the past from the lifethreatening danger of an identity that has no exit on alterity. Though
Benjamin does not call it aura, his description of encountering his own impenetrable gaze in ‘the dark room of the lived moment’ where this past is
exposed to view, illustrates that aura ‘thrives in its decline’, to quote from
Samuel Weber. Freed from its cult status, and linked to the redemption of
history, Benjamin continues to identify art and its aura with salvation. ‘In
remembrance’, he writes in the Arcades Project, ‘we have an experience that
forbids us to conceive of history as fundamentally atheological . . .’40 In this
reading, the distance at the heart of the aura would reveal a rapprochement
between pre- and post-technological perception. If we have always had eyes
that we might not see, to paraphrase the epigraph that opened this essay,
technological media ensure that we nonetheless continue to be seen by the
gaze of an involuntary memory that admonishes us to seek out those moments
when we stood out from the crowd like Baudelaire’s passante, enclosed in an
aura of unlived potential.
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2
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
Mondzain: ‘Any image that seeks a gaze
can manifest only negatively the spectral
essence of the Veronica. Might not all
works of art be false acheiropoietic images?’
Image, icône, économie (Paris: Seuil, 1996),
pp. 248 and 252. The aura, that is, does
not depend upon presence, but precisely
upon absence, the material traces of an
absent body that once appeared in the
now of a bloody winding sheet. This absence, we might add, is at the very heart of
the Christian iconic tradition from its inception, as icons are never unique but
rather always copies of an acheiropoietic
trace, of which the Turin Shroud is but
the last variation in a long series. And the
acheirpoietic trace is itself made in the
image of an invisible and formless archetype. But this optical unconscious that the
camera effectively revealed, was appropriated by the Church in the name of continuity and institutional hegemony (this in
spite of contradictory evidence by NASA
and the CNRS dating the sheet from
1260–1390). So in this sense, the camera
was a prosthetic for the institution rather
than an arm against it, and the auratic
value of this technological monument is
unequalled in the Catholic Tradition.
Samuel Weber and Paul Virilio have
written some excellent work on this subject. See Weber’s Mass Mediauras: Form,
Technics, Media (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1996) and Paul Virilio,
Open Sky (New York: Verso, 1997).
Benjamin, Illuminations, pp. 222–3.
Ibid., footnote 5 on p. 224 (found on
p. 243).
‘Little History of Photography’, SW 2:
518–19, cited in Andrew Benjamin,
Walter Benjamin and Art (London:
Continuum Press, 2005), p. 172.
Benjamin, Illuminations, p. 188.
Ibid.
Hume for instance, in his Natural History
of Religion describes this tendency to attribute intentionality to the world in the
following words:
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description in the unpublished protocol
of his hashish experiments (Section ‘P’,
p. 58, Gesammelte Schriften 6:588) cited
in Miriam Bratu Hansen, ‘Benjamin’s
Aura,’ Critical Inquiry 34 (Winter 2008),
p. 358. Though this may very well be the
case, the term ‘aura’ has taken on a life of
its own thanks to Benjamin, freeing itself
from the medical field and entering into
the philosophy of art and representation.
Jacques Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts
of Psychoanalysis, Alan Sheridan (trans.),
(W. W. Norton & Co., 1998), p. 109.
Walter Benjamin, Illuminations (New
York: Schocken Books, 2007), pp. 221;
220.
Ibid., p. 221.
Ibid., p. 236.
Benjamin, ‘Theses on the Philosophy of
History,’ in Illuminations, p. 263. In The
Arcades Project, he similarly writes: ‘The
essential concept of universal history, is
a messianic concept’, The Arcades Project
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2002), ‘N’, p. 485.
Adorno to Benjamin on March 18th,
1936. Cited in Charlie Bertsch, ‘The
Aura and its Simulacral Double’, Critical
Sense (Fall, 1996) 22.
Let us use as an example the photographic
plate that revealed the Holy Shroud of
Turin. This image became the most important relic of the Catholic Church only
when the photographic negative revealed
the hidden traces of sweat and blood that
drew the figure of a crucified man on the
winding sheet. Invisible to the naked eye,
the image/relic was revealed by the camera
in 1898, to the shock of the lawyer
Secondo Pia who had no inkling of the
revelation he had unwittingly brought to
light. In this sense, the image not made by
human hand was revealed only by means of
another image not made by human hands,
that of the camera. There is a sense then, in
which modern technological photography, the writing of light, perfectly responds to the auratic function of the medieval image. To quote Marie-José
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Benjamin, Illuminations, Baudelaire essay,
opus cité, pp. 188–9.
In closing her article ‘Images of the
Aura’, Beryl Schlossman writes, in reference to Benjamin’s text on Baudelaire:
‘The atmosphere around Baudelaire and
his poetry has been emptied of aura: the
planet is without an atmosphere, the poet
is deprived of air, and the eyes that cast
their familiar glances on the subject who
speaks in these poems are empty. The air
of aura does not bow any more; adorable
Spring has lost its perfume. Suddenly invisible, the uncrowned Poet slips into the
crowd and wanders in search of pleasure,
forgetting, and the images of artifice.’
Beryl Schlossman, ‘Images of the Aura:
Some Motifs in French Modernism’, in
Dag Peterson and Erik Steinskog (eds),
Actualities of Aura (Helsinki: Nordic
Summer University Press, 2005), p. 291.
Benjamin, Illuminations, p. 188.
Ibid., p. 160–61.
Walter
Benjamin,
Arcades
Project
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2002), p. 447 (344).
Ibid., p. 447.
Miriam Bratu Hansen, ‘Benjamin’s Aura’,
Critical Inquiry, pp. 351–2.
Ibid., pp. 345–6.
Du coté de chez Swann (vol. 1, 67–69),
cited in Benjamin, The Arcades Project,
K, p. 403.
Samuel Weber has drawn an interesting
parallel between Heidegger’s Weltbilt
essay and Benjamin’s Artwork essay. In
both essays, he writes, the world is
‘brought forth and set before the subject,
whose place thus seems secured by the
object of its representation. What holds
the aura of originality in place, as it
were, is the subject as its point of reference, just as, conversely and reciprocally,
the subject is ensconced, ‘‘embedded’’,
held in place and at rest, by the scene
that it both observes and also ‘‘breathes
in’’ ’. Mass Mediauras: Form, Technics,
Media, (Stanford: SUP, 1996) p. 86.
The Arcades Project, 461. Or, as has
become far more common, to carry
over the principle of history into montage. One might think for an example of
this of Chris Marker’s 1962 film La Jetée,
where scientists concoct a machine that
can read the optical unconscious, pulling
images out of the unconscious mind into
the light of consciousness. The image of a
woman’s face, which flashes forth without being summoned, serves in the film
as the key to redemptive history, yet
hidden in this unconscious and thus
unexploitable image from the past lies
the only future possible, that of the
death of the dreamer. For a more
recent example, we could look at
Werner Herzog’s 2011 film, Cave of
Forgotten Dreams, where he explicitly
refers to Benjamin when he speaks of
the aura of the cave paintings, which
overwhelm the spectator when he or
she wanders through what he calls ‘the
cave of forgotten memories’ that were
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‘There is a universal tendency amongst
mankind to conceive all beings like
themselves, and to transfer to every
object those qualities, with which they
are familiarly acquainted, and of which
they are intimately conscious . . . No
wonder, then, that mankind, being
placed in such an absolute ignorance
of causes, and being at the same time
so anxious concerning their future fortunes, should immediately acknowledge
a dependence on invisible powers, possest of sentiment and intelligence . . .
Nor is it long before we ascribe to
them thought, and reason, and passion,
and sometimes even the limbs and figures of men, in order to bring them
nearer to a resemblance with ourselves.’
David Hume, The Natural History of
Religion, pp. 33–34, cited in Jonathan
Z. Smith, ‘Religion,
Religions,
Religious,’ in Relating Religion: Essays
in the Study of Religion (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2004),
pp. 185.
THE OPTICAL UNCONSCIOUS
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485
What Benjamin calls the ‘weak messianic
power’ of history, depends upon incompletion, upon the unfinished and unfinishable project of remembrance. These
images of the past, then, are images of
redemption for Benjamin, and they heal
the suffering of the present. In other
words, it is the present understood as
complete that is traumatic and that
Benjamin calls suffering. The mindfulness
of remembrance, he writes, ‘can make
the incomplete (happiness) into something complete, and the complete (suffering) into something incomplete. That is
theology; but in remembrance we have
an experience that forbids us to conceive
of
history
as
fundamentally
atheological . . .’ Cited in Benjamin,
Arcades Project, N 471.
I have borrowed this phrase from Samuel
Weber, Mass Mediauras: Form, Technics,
Media, p. 101.
Benjamin, Arcades Project, N, 473.
The passage merits being cited in full:
‘More frequent, perhaps, are the cases
when the half-light of habit denies the
plate the necessary light for years, until
one day from an alien source it flashes
as if from burning magnesium powder,
and now a snapshot transfixes the
room’s image on the plate. It is we ourselves, however, who are always standing
at the center of these rare images. Nor is
this very mysterious, since such moments
of sudden illumination are at the same
time moments when we are separated
from ourselves, and while our waking,
habitual, everyday self is involved actively
or passively in what is happening, our
deeper self rests in another place and is
touched by the shock . . . It is to this immolation of our deepest self in shock that
our memory owes its most indelible
images.’ Benjamin, ‘A Berlin Chronicle,’
SW 2, 633.
‘A Short Speech on Proust,’ (GS, 2:
1064).
This externalised self is compared by
Hansen to the kabbalistic theory of the
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lost to view for some 35,000 years of
history.
‘A Little History of Photography,’ in SW,
2:510–512.
In his own words, ‘only dialectical images
are genuine images (that is, not archaic).
And the place where one encounters
them is language’ (Arcades Project, N,
462).
Gerhard
Richter
describes
Benjamin’s dialectical image in the following words: ‘He looks awry, seeking his material and inspiration not in the officially
sanctioned sites of a cultural text but in
the refuse and debris that has been overlooked, repressed, or marginalized.
Through a strategic montage, in which
the neglected debris of history is put into
new grammatical constellation, a true revolutionary image emerges. This image,
lodged in the language of its literary performance, is, for Benjamin, that of history
itself.’ Gerhard Richter, ‘Benjamin’s
Confessional and Literary Writings,’ in
David Ferris (ed.), Cambridge Companion to
Walter Benjamin (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004) p. 233.
‘The dialectical image is an image that
emerges suddenly, in a flash. What has
been is to be held fast – as an image
flashing up in the now of its recognizability. The rescue that is carried out
by these means – and only by these –
can operate solely for the sake of what
in the next moment is already irretrievably lost.’ Benjamin, Arcades Project,
p. 473.
‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’ in
Benjamin, Illuminations, p. 261.
Benjamin, Arcades Project, N, p. 485.
Benjamin, Illuminations, p. 263. And again
on page 254: ‘In other words, our image
of happiness is indissolubly bound up
with the image of redemption. The
same applies to our view of the past,
which is the concern of history. The
past carries with it a temporal index by
which it is referred to redemption.’
Benjamin, Illuminations, p. 263.
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tselem, image or Bild. Benjamin’s friend
and specialist of kabbalah, Gershom
Scholem, himself makes this connection,
citing certain kabbalistic texts to bring
home the comparison. Hansen cites the
following from Scholem (a 16th-century
text of prophesy): ‘The complete secret
of prophesy to a prophet consists in that
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he sees the form of his self standing
before him, and he forgets his own self
and (is removed from it; entrückt) . . . and
that form (of his self) speaks with him
and tells him the future’ ‘Benjamin’s
Aura’, p. 371.
Benjamin, Arcades Project, ‘N’, p. 471.
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