Chapter

1

Derivation

by

Phase

Noam

Chomsky

What

follows

extends

and

revises

an

earlier

paper

(``Minimalist

Inquiries,''

MI),

1

which

outlines

a

framework

for

pursuit

of

the

so-called

Minimalist

Program,

one

of

a

number

of

alternatives

that

are

currently

being

explored.

The

shared

goal

is

to

formulate

in

a

clear

and

useful

wayÐand

to

the

extent

possible

to

answerÐa

fundamental

question

of

the

study

of

lan-

guage,

which

until

recently

could

hardly

be

considered

seriously

and

may

still

be

premature:

to

what

extent

is

the

human

faculty

of

language

FL

an

optimal

solution

to

minimal

design

speci®cations,

conditions

that

must

be

satis®ed

for

language

to

be

usable

at

all?

We

may

think

of

these

speci®-

cations

as

``legibility

conditions'':

for

each

language

L

(a

state

of

FL),

the

expressions

generated

by

L

must

be

``legible''

to

systems

that

access

these

objects

at

the

interface

between

FL

and

external

systemsÐexternal

to

FL,

internal

to

the

person.

The

strongest

minimalist

thesis

SMT

would

hold

that

language

is

an

optimal

solution

to

such

conditions.

The

SMT,

or

a

weaker

version,

becomes

an

empirical

thesis

insofar

as

we

are

able

to

determine

interface

conditions

and

to

clarify

notions

of

``good

design.''

While

the

SMT

cannot

be

seriously

entertained,

there

is

by

now

reason

to

believe

that

in

non-

trivial

respects

some

such

thesis

holds,

a

surprising

conclusion

insofar

as

it

is

true,

with

broad

implications

for

the

study

of

language,

and

well

beyond.

Note

the

inde®nite

article:

an

optimal

solution.

``Good

design''

condi-

tions

are

in

part

a

matter

of

empirical

discovery,

though

within

general

guidelines

of

an

a

prioristic

character,

a

familiar

feature

of

rational

in-

quiry.

In

the

early

days

of

the

modern

scienti®c

revolution,

for

example,

there

was

much

concern

about

the

interplay

of

experiment

and

mathe-

matical

reasoning

in

determining

the

nature

of

the

world.

Even

the

most

extreme

proponents

of

deductive

reasoning

from

®rst

principles,

Descartes